Evil, feminism and a philosophy of transformation by Clack, Beverley J.
1 
Evil, Feminism and a Philosophy of Transformation 
Position Paper, Melbourne, July 2014 
Introduction: Shifting the Ground 
There’s an old joke – a very old joke - which describes fittingly the stance on evil to 
be taken in this paper. Some townies are lost in the deepest English countryside. 
Waving down a local, they ask for directions. The response to their query is not 
immediately helpful: ‘if that’s the place you are looking for, I wouldn’t start from 
here, if I were you.’ 
 
I want to make a similar response – albeit, I hope, in the long run more helpful - to 
those engaged in the form of discourse which dominates discussion of evil in the 
philosophy of religion. As anti-theodicists have been at pains to point out (Phillips 
1988; Surin 1986; Tilley 1991), these arguments revolve around an assumption of evil 
as a puzzle that needs to be solved. Rarely is the problem of evil approached in such a 
way as to provide reasons that would satisfy those struggling with the lived-
experience of suffering, either as the result of natural forces or the actions of others.1    
 
While my starting point is not dissimilar to that of the anti-theodicist, my concern is 
not to expose in any more detail the irrelevance of the answers offered by theodicists 
for those struggling with the felt affects of evil or the experience of suffering.2 The 
aspect I wish to pursue here relates to something hinted at in Kenneth Surin’s 
                                                 
1 That the anti-theodicist arguments have found their mark is suggested by Eleanor Stump’s recent use 
of narrative to explore the issue of suffering and the kind of defence of God that might be made in light 
of its reality (Stump 2010).  
2 While we might well argue that evil and suffering are separate issues – the former dealing with 
metaphysical questions of the nature of the universe, the latter with the lived-experience of evils, 
natural and moral – in practice the two categories are invariably blurred in the discussions of 
philosophers and theodicists. 
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discussion of theodicy: namely, that unintended consequences may arise from 
pursuing theodical arguments (Surin 1986: 154-163). In the attempt to form detached 
and purportedly objective responses to the problem, theodicists run the risk of dulling 
their senses – moral and emotional – to the very real suffering of individuals and 
communities.3 My concern is to consider a response to evil that might move beyond 
this claim. How might an account of the sources of evil and suffering be made that 
enables better ways of living to emerge? As such, the discussion of evil that follows 
locates the problem in the realm of ethics, my contention being that it is only by so-
doing that we are able to avoid the problems anti-theodicists have identified with the 
intellectual pursuit of evil. 
 
It is worth spending a little time on this reframing of the problem as it raises more 
general questions about what philosophy as a discipline can or cannot achieve. When 
a philosopher approaches the problem of evil, they do so with a particular aim in 
mind. For some, the concern will be to provide a possible ‘solution’ to the problem:4 
and this may well involve making distinctions between the ‘logical’ and the ‘emotive’ 
(or experiential or evidential) problem of evil. They may have a particular tradition in 
mind, and may be addressing the problem in order to establish a convincing 
theological apologetic. Whatever the aim, something much more fundamental is at 
work, for the way in which evil is approached reveals much about the way in which 
the very practice of philosophy is understood.   
                                                 
3 Surin’s approach reflects, similarly, that of Jürgen Moltmann: the way in which we construct our 
image of God has an impact on the way in which we structure our relationships with others. So for 
Moltmann, advocating divine apatheia cultivates apathy in the response – or lack of it – that might be 
made to those suffering (1974: 267-278). 
4 I am not convinced by the turn, inspired by Alvin Plantinga (1977), and developed by philosophers 
such as Stump (2010: 19-20), that there is a real difference between offering a ‘complete’ theodicy and 
a ‘partial’ defence. The focus remains on solving – or at least going some way to solve – a problem for 
God, rather than ameliorating the experience of suffering (see Clack 2005).  
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In the analytic tradition, the practice of philosophy involves the analysis and criticism 
of language; it involves aligning oneself – as closely as possible - to the methods and 
practices of science. Its detractors have been similarly certain about what philosophy 
involves, and have consistently – and insistently - pointed to the failure of 
philosophers to engage with the questions of ‘real life’. For Paul Ricoeur’s ‘Masters 
of Suspicion’, this failure leads to the conclusion that philosophical practice is an 
irrelevance. Thus for Freud, the desire to practice philosophy reflects a melancholic 
disposition that seeks answers to questions that could never be answered (Freud 1960: 
436), while detracting from the much more realistic and worthwhile work of empirical 
scientific investigation (Freud 1916-17: 20). For Nietzsche, it denotes the failure to 
say ‘yes’ to life (Gay Science §327; 2001: 182-3). This criticism leads Nietzsche to 
frame his ‘gay science’ as a means of changing the values of the old world to this 
affirmation of life; be it through dancing with Dionysus (GS §381; 2001: 246) or 
through ‘philosophising with a hammer’ (Nietzsche [1889] 1990). For Marx, what 
matters is engaging in practical politics: “the philosophers have only interpreted the 
world, in various ways; the point is to change it” (Marx 1845: 184).   
 
In suggesting an ethical focus for the discussion of evil, I am aligning myself with 
aspects of those critiques: most notably with the emphasis placed by Marx and 
Nietzsche on the kind of practice most likely to bring about transformation, of one’s 
self and of the world.5 That does not mean, however, that I intend to accept their 
rather pessimistic vision of what philosophy can – or rather, cannot - achieve. I do not 
                                                 
5 In asserting the transformative nature of philosophical practice, I am building upon Michael 
McGhee’s formulation of philosophy as spiritual practice (McGhee 2000). 
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accept that philosophy is, by its very nature, a practice disengaged from the everyday 
task of living. Indeed, by aligning philosophy of religion with ethics, and approaching 
the discussion of evil in this way, I believe it is possible to show something of the 
importance of critical religious thought and practice for how we might live.6   
 
In shaping an ethical approach to the problem, the insights of feminist philosophers of 
religion are invaluable: not least because the political dimension is central to feminist 
theorising. For the feminist to discuss evil and suffering necessitates considering the 
questions it raises for our life together; for the feminist philosopher, it raises questions 
about the way in which philosophical discussions affect the way we act in the world. 
This makes an engagement with practical politics impossible to avoid and leads me to 
frame the argument of this paper in the following way: is it possible to shape a 
philosophy of evil capable of enabling the kind of life that supports human 
flourishing? (And in emphasising human flourishing, I understand that notion to 
involve not just the life of the individual, but also, crucially, the shape of the political 
and social realm.7)   
 
In framing the discussion in this way, I am indebted to the insights of Mary Midgley. 
In her innovative investigation of wickedness ([1984] 2001), Midgley directs attention 
away from insolvable and unknowable debates about God and metaphysics, towards 
the much more practical task of trying to understand the sources of human 
wickedness. For Midgley, the discussion of evil is primarily an ethical one, for it 
                                                 
6 It says much about the dominance of one way of proceeding in the Anglo-American philosophy of the 
20th century that this view of philosophy can appear rather novel. As Martha Nussbaum (1996) 
amongst others has shown, this vision of a philosophy that might be able to ameliorate the experience 
of suffering (to paraphrase Epicurus) shapes the earliest forms of the discipline.  
7 Here I am indebted to the work of Grace Jantzen whose feminist philosophy of religion was explicitly 
structured around the promotion of human flourishing (Jantzen 1998). 
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raises questions of how it might be resisted, as well as forcing us to consider the 
nature of the good life.   
 
To approach evil as a problem for human beings rather than for God raises questions 
about the contribution that can be made by the philosophy of religion. My hope is that 
approaching evil in this way allows for a fresh appreciation of why religious 
perspectives might be helpful for engaging with this most pressing of concerns.   
 
Identifying Evil: The Contribution of Feminist Analysis  
In suggesting that the problem of evil be framed primarily as an ethical issue, I 
understand ‘the ethical’ to denote both the way in which social relationships are 
shaped by political structures, and the way in which personal relationships are 
conducted. Moreover, in pursuing an ethical approach to evil, I want to suggest the 
importance of one’s orientation to the world, for it is here that the practice of 
philosophy of religion proves significant.  
 
In order to make this shift towards the ethical, it is necessary to start with an element 
often lacking in the analyses of evil offered by philosophers of religion: the social and 
political context for personal relationships. To even get close to understanding the 
sources of evil, it is vital to consider the social locatedness of the human subject, and 
here feminist philosophy provides an important starting point: not least because it 
allows for examination of the ideas that support social and political life.  
 
Feminist philosophy connects critical analysis with practical, political action; a 
connection which holds out the prospect of transforming academic discussions of evil. 
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While there may be different feminisms, each reflecting different theoretical 
positions,8 they share a common concern to expose and correct the marginalisation of 
women’s lives and experiences, and to address gender injustice. And feminist 
philosophy, as Gillian Howie points out, is explicit about an implicit feature of all 
philosophy: namely that “every philosophy is practical, even when it seems at its most 
contemplative: its method a social and political weapon” (2012: 9).   
 
That feminism arose out of women’s struggles to be recognised as ‘fully human’ - to 
use Rosemary Ruether’s memorable phrase (1983: 18) - inevitably means that, far 
from being a distraction, the discussion of evil is at the heart of the feminist 
commitment to changing the world. To locate the discussion of evil in a political 
movement for change necessitates considering the way in which ‘evil’ is defined. For 
the feminist, concerned with identifying and resisting gender injustice, the issue of 
moral evil takes priority. (Indeed, for the vast majority of feminists - and specifically 
for ecofeminists - the notion of physical or ‘natural’ evil is a misnomer. The natural 
processes which make human life possible cannot be described as ‘evil’ even if their 
affects are felt in human suffering (Plumwood 1993). This is an idea with an ancient 
pedigree: when Seneca writes on the propriety of natural processes, he is at pains to 
conclude that if you don’t like the suffering that accompanies life in this world, that’s 
your problem. Such experiences, he says bluntly, are the price we pay for the 
privilege of being alive (Letter XCI; 1969: 181-2).) 
 
In making their focus the exposure of injustice, feminists expand the very notion of 
what counts as ‘evil’ to include not just individual moral failures but its socially-
                                                 
8 For a brief description of these differences, see Clack 2013: 326-328. 
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embedded manifestations. As Sharon Welch and others note, to understand injustice, 
its enactment and perpetuation through political and social structures has to be 
addressed (Welch 1989). To describe the way in which these interlocking structures 
allow oppressive practices to be enacted and enshrined in personal relationships, they 
use the term ‘structural evils’.  
 
We might at this point question the propriety of using the term ‘evil’, accepting, with 
Midgley, that we are better advised to employ, instead, the terms ‘wickedness’ or 
‘injustice’.  It is, however, powerful to name something ‘an evil’. Something about 
the very word demands we take seriously things that are ‘out of joint’; that an attitude 
or an event or a history is so wrong that we must act to ‘put things right’. In drawing 
attention to structural evils, the feminist demand is that we seek ways of challenging 
and changing such structures. At the same time, extending the notion of what 
constitutes evil does something more: it alerts us to the fact that what is meant by 
‘evil’ is not self-evident. Ideological commitments are reflected in the definitions 
which are offered. There is no purely objective stance to be taken to this work of 
definition: ideas are never ‘innocent’, for they reflect our starting point but also, 
crucially, they shape the way in which the world is conceived and society structured.  
 
Exploring the relationship between ideas and social practice formed a large part of the 
work of early feminist philosophical analysis which centred on exposing the way in 
which definitions of ‘Woman’ shaped the exclusion of women from the public realm. 
So Genevieve Lloyd (1984) and Susan Moller Okin (1979) were at pains to expose 
the unacknowledged history of misogyny in Western philosophical and religious 
thought. Building upon Simone de Beauvoir’s contention that gender is not a given, 
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but is constructed over time by family, social and historical assumptions (Beauvoir 
[1949] 1972), they detailed the historical constructions of ‘Woman’ as that which 
stood in opposition to the values claimed by the male.    
 
Realising the amount of energy spent by past philosophers and theologians on 
defining ‘Woman’ can come as something of a surprise.9 Even more surprising can be 
the realisation that their ‘findings’ all-too-frequently identify women with ‘evil’. An 
example: if Aristotle viewed the female as essentially passive matter to be shaped by 
the active male (in Clack 1999: 31-36), this notion was developed by Aquinas to 
claim that Woman is fundamentally flawed; she is, in his words, a “defective male” 
(in Clack 1999: 77). For medieval theologians concerned with the phenomenon of 
witchcraft, the ‘fact’ that Woman is ontologically flawed makes women the perfect 
conduit for evil. When Kramer and Sprenger write their handbook for witch-finders in 
the 15th century, it is not surprising that, as a result, they view women as peculiarly 
linked to that which is evil. Evil entered the world through a woman: a process which 
did not end there but which is continued in the actions of all women, cast as her 
daughters (in Clack 1999: 89).  
 
If women are defined as, at worst, incapable of goodness, at best, limited in their 
ability to pursue the moral life, practical measures will be deemed necessary to curb 
their influence. To define women as evil is not, then, to partake in whimsical 
                                                 
9 My Misogyny in the Western Philosophical Tradition: A Reader (1999) resulted from the shocked 
realisation that western philosophers and theologians had spent an inordinate amount of time engaging 
with the question of ‘who woman was’ and what it was that ‘she’ wanted’. Becoming conscious of the 
extent to which ‘Woman’ had been considered an object to be studied radically challenged my sense of 
philosophy as a neutral and objective practice: rather its history and its categories reflected the social 
positioning of one group: usually white, usually affluent, males. 
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reflections that have little bearing on lived relationships; indeed, such notions were 
felt in social practices which constrained the lives of generations of women.10 
 
The task for the feminist philosopher of religion, confronted with such a history, is to 
expose the theological and philosophical basis – both then and now – for legitimising 
gender injustice. To paraphrase Marx, the role of critique is to tear up the illusions 
that justify oppression (1844: 171). The analysis of ideas, as a result, is not simply for 
the sake of analysis alone. Analysing ideas and their affects has the power to 
challenge social injustice, for the critical function of philosophical practice is not an 
end in itself, but provides the groundwork for changing unjust social conditions. 
 
Social Structures, Evils and Human Suffering 
It is relatively easy to frame philosophy as a critical practice which challenges 
assumptions; even as a practice that alters the way in which individuals might be 
encouraged to modify their attitudes and behaviours. We might think, for example, of 
the role of the ‘spiritual exercise’ to bring about change in the attitudes and behaviour 
of the individual, as described by Martha Nussbaum (1996) and Pierre Hadot (1995) 
in their accounts of the Hellenistic Schools. But can critique transform social 
                                                 
10 For a classic account of the history of misogyny, see Marilyn French 1992. While we might like to 
think that such days are long gone, claims of female fallibility continue to inform debates about the 
unequal numbers of men and women in public life and leadership roles. Recent discussion highlights 
the problems of a male-dominated political elite. In the UK, a cross-party inquiry has been set up to 
consider why many women MPs are stepping down at the next election: ‘MPs call for action to keep 
more women in politics, Daily Telegraph (9 February 2014) 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/10626637/MPs-call-for-action-to-keep-more-
women-in-politics.html. It may not be so hard to understand, a female MP reporting her experience of 
being barracked for having a northern accent http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/tories-
deliberately-mock-women-mps-for-their-northern-accents-says-pat-glass-9133437.html. Arguments 
that women need to ‘toughen up’ in the face of such treatment – often expressed by women - suggest 
the extent to which claims of female weakness permeate the political world. Rather than challenge the 
way in which politics is conducted, this response suggests the problem lies with women for wanting to 
change it.  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-politics/10649213/Former-Tory-MPs-If-these-
silly-modern-female-MPs-cant-cope-they-shouldnt-be-there.html     
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practices? If the Masters of Suspicion claim too little for philosophy, am I claiming 
too much? 
 
Hannah Arendt’s work suggests that this kind of socially-engaged, transformative 
philosophy is a very real possibility for philosophical practice: but only if we 
challenge entrenched assumptions about what ‘philosophy’ involves. Like Nietzsche, 
Marx and Freud, Arendt is sceptical of the extent to which philosophy can be of use to 
the practical task of shaping the public realm. “Burdened by tradition”11, philosophers 
cannot easily respond to the plurality of positions that characterises her vision of the 
kind of public space we should aim to create; a vision that is, to her mind, most 
conducive to the flourishing of individuals.12  
 
Yet her depiction of thought as a disruptive practice provides a helpful framework for 
integrating theory and practice in such a way that philosophy can be part of the 
process by which social change is brought about. In Arendt’s philosophy is the 
groundwork for an ethical approach to the problem of evil which illuminates the 
possibility of effecting personal and social transformation.    
 
Arendt is doubtless best known for her report of the trial of the Nazi war criminal 
Adolf Eichmann for the New Yorker Magazine. Eichmann could not have looked less 
like the popular image of a war criminal: he was a shabby little bureaucrat, not a 
                                                 
11 This comment is taken from a conversation with Günter Gaus, in Baehr 2000: 4. 
12 Arendt also raises the question of the political failure of philosophers to identify injustice as 
injustice; the most obvious case being found in Arendt’s mentor and erstwhile lover Heidegger’s 
inability to see Nazism as something to be resisted not accepted. As Dana Villa describes it, in 
Heidegger there is found “the ‘strange alliance’ between philosophy and thoughtlessness” (Villa 1996: 
192). Abstract thought of the kind in which Heidegger excelled means little if there is no “care for the 
world” (Villa 1996: 192).  
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monstrous presence of evil. As she attempts to understand him, she arrives at her 
famous description of ‘the banality of evil’.13 Eichmann is troubling because he is so 
ordinary, and, in framing the evil he represents as ‘banal’, Arendt refuses to set him 
apart from the rest of humanity. If anything, he is an example of what she describes as 
a “new type of criminal” (1964: 276), whose crimes emerge from a particular set of 
social conditions and working practices. Far from being a monster, he exhibits 
attitudes and behaviours common to many. In developing this analysis, Arendt makes 
a compelling case for linking social and political structures with the creation of 
individual attitudes, and thus raises the importance of embarking on forms of action 
that enable the transformation of both.   
 
Arendt begins with an analysis of the structures that support oppression and the 
perpetration of destructive acts. To understand Eichmann, he must be placed in the 
context of the twentieth century’s burgeoning dependence upon bureaucratic systems 
for structuring the state and shaping human behaviour. The roots of this phenomenon 
are first set out in her Origins of Totalitarianism ([1951] 1968), before being taken up 
once more in her report on the Eichmann trial.  
 
Arendt claims that bureaucracies enable the flourishing of individuals like Eichmann: 
individuals who are rendered incapable of associating their particular, isolated tasks 
with the broader agenda of their employers through the working practices of their 
institution. Bureaucracies operate on the basis that a prescribed end can be achieved 
through the implementation of rules and procedures (Weber 1947). Such systems give 
                                                 
13 Richard J Bernstein offers a fine account of Arendt’s conception of evil which includes reflections 
on the controversy surrounding and the critique of her notion of banality (2002: 205-235).  
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the appearance of being ‘rational’ and easy to manage in comparison with the messy 
reality of dealing with idiosyncratic and apparently ‘irrational’ individuals. While 
there might be some truth in this, the effect of such a judgement is that the human 
realm, made up of such individuals, and thus beset with uncertainty, becomes 
characterised as less trustworthy than ‘the system’ itself.  
 
If human relationships are disparaged in this way, bureaucratic states require the 
worker to limit their understanding of the scope of their work to the specific task with 
which they are engaged. For a worker to succeed in such a workplace, they must 
become “a mere function” of the organisation (1968: 215), ‘aloof’ from ordinary 
human concerns that might obscure the focus on achieving the prescribed social 
ends.14 To be successful as a function necessitates resisting the kind of thoughtfulness 
that would connect one’s actions to effects felt in the lives of others.15  
 
In such a context, Eichmann becomes a rather successful example of a bureaucrat. 
This dull little man surprised Arendt because he was, if anything, all-too-familiar; not 
that different from the kind of administrator who might encountered anywhere, whose 
job is similarly fragmented, focused on specific tasks which are, in turn, detached 
from the broader aims of their organisation.   
 
                                                 
14 Arendt identifies this ideal in the methods of administration and the promotion of this kind of 
administrator in the structures developed by the British to effectively manage their Empire (1968: 212).  
15 A current example might be the number of reports suggesting that UK Job Centres are setting targets 
for sanctioning benefits claimants, thus enabling a culture of intimidation – both for claimants and Job 
Centre staff http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/mar/25/jobcentre-newsletter-sanctions-targets. 
While these claims have been rejected by the UK Department of Work and Pensions, such claims 
continue to be made: http://politicalscrapbook.net/2014/02/jobcentre-awarded-staff-gold-stars-for-
sanctioning-claimants/ 
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Social practices therefore have an effect on the ethics of the individual, and her 
conclusion goes far beyond explaining the actions of one individual. To reiterate, 
Eichmann is a “new type of criminal…who commits his crimes under circumstances 
that make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or to feel that he is doing wrong” 
(Arendt 1964: 276). The modern workplace, shaped by bureaucratic systems, provides 
an ideal spawning ground for ‘moral idiots’ like Eichmann; people who become 
incapable of making the connection between their actions and the fate of others. It is 
thus thoughtlessness – understood as the failure to connect – that provides fertile 
ground for evil to flourish. 
 
The philosopher of religion, intent on discovering the roots of evil, might not 
automatically turn their attention to the workplace. But for Arendt this is vital, for 
there is a connection between apparently neutral social structures and the effect they 
have on the actions of those who inhabit them. Expect the wicked to be monstrous 
and you are unlikely to recognise wickedness when it is being enacted (Midgley 
[1984] 2001: 4-5; 140). Indeed, for Arendt evil is able to flourish because of the kind 
of thoughtlessness demanded by specific working practices. In terms of how we 
proceed in our discussions of evil, there may be dangers for the theodicist who wishes 
to resist engaging with the problem of Auschwitz;16 but what Arendt suggests is that 
it is no less problematic to focus exclusively on “horrendous evils” (Adams 1999). To 
locate evil outside the realm of day-to-day activities runs the risk of divorcing it from 
                                                 
16 See Stephen T Davis’ attempt to do this (Davis 2001: 73-89), and John Roth’s criticisms of such a 
move (Roth in Davis 2001: 97-101). 
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the petty actions and failures that allow hideous acts of wickedness and injustice to 
flourish.17  
 
Arendt’s example of Eichmann - while useful for making this shift from the 
extraordinary to the ordinary – might still act to obscure the relative ordinariness of 
the sources of evil. Eichmann’s job, after all, was to ensure the trains ran on time to 
the death camps, and his claims to ignorance were undercut by the fact that he had 
been an eye-witness to mass murder (Arendt 1963: 87-90). A rather different example 
might prove helpful at this point; one which focuses on something small and 
apparently insignificant whose over-appreciation acts as a means of ignoring one’s 
fundamental responsibilities to the other. In the process, we move some way towards 
thinking about how reflection on the sources of evil can be used to think seriously 
about what it means to live well.  
 
Muriel Spark’s novel The Girls of Slender Means opens with the line: “Long ago in 
1945 all the nice people in England were poor, allowing for exceptions” (1963: 1). 
This opening sets the tone for what is, apparently, a light-hearted story of a group of 
genteel young women, rivals in love and for the use of a single designer gown. It ends 
as a much darker tale. An unexploded bomb, hidden in the garden of the hostel they 
inhabit, explodes, and a fire ensues. Caught in a tiny bathroom, there is a gap in a 
window that only the thinnest can negotiate in order to escape. Selina, having 
escaped, contrives a return. Nicholas - her lover – assumes “she had done this in an 
attempt to rescue one of the girls, or assist their escape through the window” (1963: 
                                                 
17 See for example newspaper reports of a man whose disability benefit payments were cut, and who, it 
has been claimed, ‘starved to death’ as a result. http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/disabled-mark-
wood-starved-death-3194250 
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122). Nothing could be further from the truth: she reappears clutching the much-
fought-over dress, pushes passed the distressed girls who remain trapped, and exits 
once more through the window, pausing once she is safely outside to inspect “the 
condition of her salvaged item” (1963: 125). Saving the dress is the priority, not the 
imminent death of friends.  
 
There is something shocking in Selina’s action; something that reflects Arendt’s 
banality of evil; the possibility of becoming desensitised to the things that really 
matter - friendship, love and compassion – while replacing them with the things that 
do not – material goods, money and status. As a result of his horror at Selina’s 
actions, Nicholas takes holy orders, having “witnessed [an] action of savagery so 
extreme that it forced him involuntarily to make an entirely unaccustomed gesture, the 
signing of the cross upon himself” (1963: 60). 
 
There is, of course, a direct relation, easily identifiable, between the callousness of 
this one individual and the suffering of her friends, left without hope and without 
comfort by someone from whom they might expect these things. In responding to this 
story, we might well console ourselves with the belief that we would not have 
behaved like Selina. More complex, perhaps, are to consider the connections between 
apparently abstract economic structures and the detrimental impact they have on the 
lives of others: particularly if we benefit from the inequalities enshrined by such 
structures. 
 
The setting for Spark’s novel is the ‘Austerity Britain’ of 1945 (see Kynaston 2007). 
The poverty of that time may not be felt by the rather genteel ladies of the May Tech 
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Hostel in quite the same way as the majority of Britons at that time: Spark’s girls are, 
after all, from the upper-middle and upper class. But that is not to say that the 
rationing of this period did not influence their actions: their fighting over a rare 
designer gown only makes sense against the backdrop of limited access to material 
goods. Indeed, Selina’s selfish actions are framed in this context: she might well have 
behaved differently if surrounded by the material comforts expected in ‘normal’ times 
by someone of her class.18 
 
This comment is not meant to absolve a spoilt girl of responsibility for her actions. 
We might feel uncomfortable if highlighting the social context for her actions leads us 
to this conclusion. At this point it is worth directing attention in a not-dissimilar way 
to the apparently abstract economic and social conditions which have similarly 
distorting effects upon our relationships with others.  
 
Pierre Bourdieu’s work on social suffering offers a way into a complex web of 
connections that are not easily identifiable and that may well prove unsettling if we 
like to think of our lives as relatively blameless ([1993] 1999). Bourdieu and his 
research team conducted interviews with a range of people from disadvantaged social 
backgrounds who were struggling to cope with “the distress caused by clashing 
interests, orientations, and lifestyles” (1999: 4). Reproduced in their entirety, these 
interviews allowed the voices of groups rarely heard to speak of their struggles and 
anxieties. Through these interviews, Bourdieu presents “the social macrocosm” 
                                                 
18 In this sense Selina’s actions could be interpreted through Bernard Williams’ notion of ‘moral luck’ 
(Williams 1981: 20-39). 
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(1999: 4) against which people live out their lives. Suffering is placed, as a result, 
within a ‘social order’.   
 
Bourdieu’s analysis can make for uncomfortable reading for those of us whose lives 
benefit from unequal economic and social relations. As Bourdieu shows, tensions in 
personal and social relations are located in the experiences of unemployment, social 
change, and shifts in global industry and finance. As Bourdieu details the effects of 
global and social trends on the lives of individuals and families, it is difficult not to be 
reminded of the familiar language of ‘restructuring’, ‘economic downturn’, 
‘rationalising the work force’ that pepper political discussion in today’s own ‘Age of 
Austerity’. The use of such abstract terms for describing economic conditions and 
their effect on working practices masks the extent to which such processes impact 
upon the lives of individuals and their social relations.  
 
Spark and Bourdieu can be read, then, as extending Arendt’s analysis in different, but 
interlocking, ways. Spark’s story challenges us to reflect upon the way we conduct 
our own personal relationships; and particularly the things that get in the way of 
taking seriously the needs of the other. In Bourdieu’s research, complex and easily 
ignored structural features are related to the day-to-day sufferings of people with 
whom we share social space. A socially-engaged philosophy will need to connect 
critical reflection upon our intimate, personal relationships with political critique. At 
the heart of a critique of this kind is the question central to the hermeneutics of 
suspicion proffered by Ricoeur’s ‘Masters of Suspicion’: ‘who benefits?’ Asking that 
question may well reveal the extent to which we are far from blameless ourselves; 
that we are, in fact, beneficiaries of advantages built upon the sufferings of others.   
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To consider the problem of evil as an ethical one necessitates, then, the kind of critical 
reflection that challenges both personal behaviour and social structures. At the heart 
of second wave feminism was the claim that ‘the personal is political’. In order to 
address what Bourdieu tellingly describes as ‘the weight of the world’ experienced by 
many, the way in which we conduct our lives - personally and politically – must be at 
the heart of our enquiry. Critical reflection, grounded in social analysis, enables the 
disruption of assumptions and attitudes. It is this that allows for an approach to evil 
that holds out the possibility of transformation: of self and society.   
 
Philosophy of Religion and the Work of Transformation 
Identifying the conditions for evil is vital; but for the ethical dimension to become 
central requires responding to the challenge evil poses for human relationships. It is 
here that I turn explicitly to the philosophy of religion, for it is a discipline that can 
provide a creative space for enabling the work of personal and social transformation. 
 
To recognise the complex web of personal and social connections that supports the 
perpetuation of suffering should not be the end of the process for an ethical 
philosophy. The next step to be taken is to turn our attention to the attitudes, 
behaviours and social structures that enable flourishing for the many, not just for the 
few. For social change that addresses the roots causes of evil to be affected requires a 
fundamental re-orientation of the self towards others and the world.  
 
To re-orientate the self requires remaking relationships with others and the world. 
And it is the notion of re-orientation that is at the heart of religious theorising and 
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practice. The very word ‘religion’ suggests something of this activity. There is a 
disputed definition which traces it to religare, meaning literally ‘to bind’. This sums 
up neatly the most laudable of the desires that drive religious practice and belief. 
Religion involves the attempt to connect: with others and with the universe. To bind 
ourselves to others and the world means addressing the current structures of society as 
well as our daily lives together.  
   
To re-orientate the self requires critical reflection: in Arendt’s terms, it requires the 
cultivation of thoughtfulness. That philosophy of religion offers space for critical 
reflection is a point hardly worth making. Yet it is worth pausing for a moment to 
consider why this kind of critical thought matters. Michèle Le Doeuff, feminist 
philosopher and activist, poses the question in the following way:  
 
We have to wonder what we are doing when we teach...Does our teaching have 
negative or supportive impact? Is it of any consequence for the future? For 
knowledge either breeds hope or crushes it when the past serves as a mirror of a 
desired future, or if one uses ‘facts’ to define and defend a norm for today and for 
the future. (Le Doeuff 2003: 82-83; my emphasis) 
 
Because she is interested in the social effect of thought, Le Doeuff grounds critical 
reflection in the ordinary tasks of living, for here its transformative power can be felt. 
Critical thought, she argues, holds out the possibility of freeing the individual from 
what she calls the ‘cognitive blockages’ that ensnare them. She provides an example 
of what this means from her work as a feminist activist:   
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A woman phones a domestic violence hotline: ‘I’m calling because…my husband, 
no, no, he isn’t violent, but I’m worried… I’m wondering whether he might 
become violent. Last night I didn’t feel like having sex, and I said so. Then he got 
a knife from the kitchen, held it to my throat, and forced me to have sex like that. I 
think he might become violent.’ It is quite usual for feminist centres to receive 
calls like this one, which both attest to the outrages inflicted on women and signal 
a kind of cognitive blockage. This woman was incapable of recognising violence 
for what it was, even when she was experiencing it. (Le Doeuff 2003: xv) 
 
Enabling space for critical reflection allows for the sources of suffering to be 
identified in order that they are challenged. And for an effective challenge to be made, 
the practise of judgement is required: on the actions of others and, crucially, on 
ourselves (Midgley [1984] 2001: 49-73; 117-135).   
 
Effective judgement requires resisting the desire to project all that is wrong out of the 
self and onto others. According to Melanie Klein, psychic development hinges on the 
movement between the ‘paranoid-schizoid’ and ‘depressive’ positions (Klein 1946). 
In the first stage of infant psychic development, the child learns to separate what is 
felt as evil from what is experienced as good; this is done by projecting onto the 
m/other all that is felt as bad. In the second stage, the child learns to take back both 
possibilities for evil and goodness into the self. This process – which Klein relates to 
maturity - suggests the importance of judging ourselves, our attitudes and our 
limitations. We must be self-critical, as well as critical of the societal structures and 
actions of others which support injustice.  
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As Arendt and Midgley contend, the problem of evil can be addressed to some extent 
through cultivating this kind of critical self-awareness. Habitual behaviours – ours 
and others – can be challenged, and, as a result, different perspectives developed.  
Developing this way of thinking cannot be taken for granted; it must form part of our 
daily practice. Here, the significance of spiritual or religious practice comes to the 
fore. We might think of the Stoic understanding of philosophy as a form of spiritual 
exercise that enshrines attitudes towards life in this world (Hadot 1995). 
Alternatively, we might think of Bonhoeffer’s claim that in a ‘world come of age’ 
Christian practice will consist ‘only’ of “prayer and righteous action” (Bonhoeffer 
[1953] 1971: 300). These claims emanate from widely different contexts but reflect 
broadly similar forms of practice. Reflective practice is not separate from how we live 
but connects our life with that of others, and necessitates living in such a way that we 
recognise our obligations to the other. What begins as a form of individual praxis, 
allows for the kind of activity capable of transforming the world.   
 
Gillian Evans’ study on educational failure and working class white children in 
Britain shows something of the possibilities open to this kind of socially-engaged 
critical reflection (2006). Evans’ ethnographic research arose from her desire to 
understand the community of a housing estate in London’s Bermondsey with whom 
she lived. Evans’ analysis focuses on describing a complex web of social relationships 
– along with the political policies and school practices - that act to enshrine the 
experience of failure in the children of this estate.  
 
The method she employs is fascinating. She describes her relationship with particular 
families; the practices of the local school; her developing relationship with the 
22 
children who she is studying. She allows the experience to challenge her own 
attitudes and beliefs: often in uncomfortable and disturbing ways (Evans 2006: 45-
47). Ultimately, however, she goes beyond simply describing a set of social 
conditions, and offers concrete proposals for the kind of educational practices, rooted 
in an understanding of social conditions, which she believes would transform the 
experiences of children growing up on such estates. The possibility of changing 
society in very practical ways grows out of her work of critique.19 
 
Now, we might say that this form of academic practice does not cohere with the aims 
of philosophy of religion; that philosophy of religion is primarily concerned with the 
analysis of ideas, not with the transformation of the political and social world. This is 
to ignore voices that suggest alternative models for the discipline: most notably, 
Grace Jantzen’s re-visioning of philosophy of religion as a practice that enables the 
cultivation of flourishing. For Jantzen, the philosophy of religion should be re-framed 
as a form of practice that “enables the divine” (1998: 204). By this, she means 
creating a space for exploring themes that relate directly to the social world. And so 
she highlights the importance of considering what makes for trustworthy 
communities; how to affect justice for others; and how to create a sustainable 
relationship with the planet. To pursue such themes necessitates praxis as well as 
reflection. Philosophy of religion becomes a practice of living, not just a way of 
thinking. To pursue this socially-embedded vision of the subject enables a sense of its 
importance to emerge. It provides a context for identifying the things that hinder 
flourishing. But it has the potential to do more than this, encouraging the kind of 
connections that make for human flourishing.   
                                                 
19 See especially Evans 2006: 158 for a synopsis of her proposals. 
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Conclusion: Evil and How to Live Well 
The problem of evil is at its most potent when it challenges the way we live. Its 
urgency is felt, not in the attempt to justify the ways of God to humans, but in the way 
it forces reflection on the conditions and attitudes that hinder human flourishing.20 
Thinking critically about the conditions that make for injustice and that support the 
suffering of individuals and communities provides the basis for an engaged 
philosophy committed to seeking better ways of living for all. A critical philosophy 
does more than provide the context for the work of deconstruction: rigorous analysis 
enables forms of living to emerge which have the potential to transform the world of 
political and social relationships. 
 
An approach to evil located in the area of ethics cannot avoid dealing with the affect 
that structures and practices have on individuals and communities. At the same time, 
it necessitates thinking seriously about the way in which our individual ways of living 
challenge or enshrine the kind of practices and attitudes that lead so many to 
experience life as harsh and uncaring.  
 
If we wish to think seriously about how best to live, the question that Grace Jantzen 
posed for the discipline is a useful one: how might the philosophies of religion we 
develop support human flourishing? Rather than shy away from this question, 
philosophers of religion should rise to its challenge, for we are well-placed to engage 
with the problems that beset our age: poverty; the affects of impersonal markets on 
                                                 
20 We might want to expand that notion of flourishing to include that of other animals and the planet 
itself: see Goodchild 2002. 
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individuals and communities; the self-interest promoted by consumer capitalism; the 
looming global disaster of climate change. Through the study of evil we can help 
develop a form of discourse and a kind of practice that enables better ways of living, 
based upon an appreciation of the importance of finding fresh ways of orientating 
ourselves to others and the world.   
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